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After collapse and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union, post-Soviet Russia faced
typical problems of state-building and nation-building. Nations are assumed as political
communities of Modernity. They are constructed in the process of nation-building and are
based on nationalism, deﬁned as worldview which perceives social reality through the
prism of dividing the world into nations-states. Nation-building is a discursive process
where state’s activities predeﬁne the type of nationalism being rooted. Using as a starting
point ‘civic versus ethnic nationalism’ dichotomy, the article develops a transformed
version of this typology, which is based on two dimensions: model of national member-
ship (openness/closeness) and model of interaction among members (universalism/hierar-
chical particularism). The analysis of Annual Addresses of the Russian Presidents
demonstrates that the Kremlin certainly produces openmodel of national membership. The
key feature of ‘Russianness’ in the Kremlin discourse is commitment to the Russian culture
where anyone can be recognized as ‘Russian’ as long as he/she shares the Russian cultural
values. At the same time, the openness is combined with neglect of ‘civicism’. In contrast to
‘civicism’, which is based on rational notions of equal rights and responsibilities and
universalistic patterns of behavior, the Kremlin image of Russian nation focuses on rather
sacral ideaof ‘theRussianway’, greathistoricalmissionas thedestinationofRussia.Openness
of nationalism entails permanent expansion of the nation ‘outside itself’ in order to ‘absorb’
those groups who are able to accept Russian culture. Since the acceptance requires deﬁnite
period of time, at any point of time Russian nation includes both ‘core of the nation’ and
‘aspirants’ that are in hierarchical order. Consequently, from the point of the second
dimension, Russian nationalism falls into the category of hierarchical particularism.
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Russia had to ﬁnd new foundations of its political exis-
tence. In spite of fairly long historical political legacy,Research Center, HanyangUniverspost-Soviet Russia was a new state which faced typical
problems of state-building and nation-building. In the
beginning of 1990s, newly formed Russian citizens
expressed uncertainty in understanding Russia’s political
community let alone the country’s future. However,
twenty years later, we can observe evident shifts towards
political stabilization supported by ongoing process of
nation-building. Since transition to Modernity, national
states have become a universal political form and have
spread over the world. Nevertheless, nation-states show
a huge variety; and it has not yet been clear what kind of
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1 In addition, Ferguson and Mansbach uncover the type of ‘overlapping
and layering polities’: “Interaction among polities that occupy some or all
of the same space constitute a vertical dimension of political life”
(Ferguson & Mansbach, 1996, p. 49). Here some centers have approximate
equal political signiﬁcance; and none of polities plays the role of ‘big
centre’ for ‘nested polities’.
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is the primary focus of the article.
In the ﬁrst part, following a brief review of scholarly
contributions in the ﬁeld, I argue that nations should be
assumed as political communities of Modernity. They are
constructed in the process of nation-building and are based
on nationalism (worldview which is inherent in Moder-
nity). Nationalism supposes the perception of social reality
through the prism of dividing the world into nation-states.
It is the speciﬁc categorization that allows making
a distinction between the people and produces a feeling of
belonging to the nation. Nevertheless, concrete national-
isms differ considerably; therefore, the second part of the
article is devoted to the typology of nationalism. Starting
from famous distinction ‘civic versus ethnic’ nationalism, I
discuss its advantages and disadvantages and develop
a transformed version of this typology which is based on
two dimensions: model of national membership (open-
ness/closeness) and model of interaction among members
(universalism/particularism). Nation-building is, ﬁrst of all,
a discursive process; and what type of nationalism emerges
from it depends on the discursive activity of the state. That
is why the third part of the article focuses on ofﬁcial
political discourse, in particular, on the Kremlin nationalist
discourse. To support my ﬁndings, I present the results of
empirical analysis of annual presidential addresses to the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.
1. Nations as political communities of modernity
It is conventional wisdom that nation and nationalism
are one of the most disputed concepts of contemporary
social sciences. For many years the main intellectual
cleavage among scholars concerned the very nature of
nations. While primordialists considered nations as natural
and eternal entities that existed ‘objectively’, their oppo-
nents – constructivists – believed that nations were the
products of social imagination, and the results of thedeﬁnite
interpretation of social reality. But now, “few if any scholars
would argue that ethnic groups or races or nations are ﬁxed
or given; virtually everyone agrees that they are historically
emergent and in some respects mutable.. In this sense, we
are all constructivists now” (Brubaker, 2009, p. 28). There-
fore, the key point of discussion has shifted toward the
issues of origin of nations and nationalisms, categorical
distinctiveness of nations and ethnicity, and so forth.
Although constructivist way of thinking as such does
not impede to treat nations as very old entities inherited
from medieval and maybe even ancient ages (Gorski,
2006), most scholars share the opposite view. Debating
heatedly on the question of historical explanations of the
rise of nations, they, nevertheless, agree that nations are
phenomenon of Modernity. I suppose, ‘modernist’ treat-
ment of nations is quite reasonable and even necessary in
the light of comparative historical analysis.
The basic idea is that modern political reality is funda-
mentally different from the pre-modern world. This
distinction is caught best in famous dichotomy of ‘center –
periphery’ that was developed by Edward Shils. He has
argued that political dominance of the center is based on
both institutional and cultural systems. The former refers to‘central system of authority’. The latter “consists of those
beliefs and expressive symbols which are concerned with
the central institutional system and with ‘things’ which
transcend the central institutional system and which
reﬂect on it” (Shils, 1982, p. 58). Consequently, it is the
central cultural system that ensures cultural commonality
– shared senses, meanings, and worldview – for the
members of polity. Such a commonality produces the
feeling of belonging to the polity, political identity, and
ultimately shapes political community.
Nevertheless, Edward Shils has pointed out that in pre-
modern polities “Much of the periphery, for most of the
time and in most spheres of action and belief, lies outside
the radius of effectiveness of the center. The outermost
fringes of the periphery remains very remote and, except
for the occasional and ill-administered collection of taxes
and tribute and the occasional imposition of certain
services, the periphery is left alone. These remote zones of
the periphery, which might include most of the population
of the society, have their own relatively autonomous
centers” (Shils, 1982, pp. 60–61). So far as these relatively
autonomous centers existed, they had their own central
institutional and cultural systems and gained political
signiﬁcance. Here one can see the type of polities which is
designated by Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach as
‘nested polities,’ “the phenomenon in which some polities
are encapsulated by others and embedded within them”
(Ferguson & Mansbach, 1996, p. 48).1 In other words, poli-
ties of this type did not strive to integrate the people into
one union and create a single political identity. Through
various types of groups such as tribes, ethnic groups, local
collectivities and estates, individuals ‘participated’ in ‘big
polity’. It was presumed the fairly strong group identities.
‘Nested centers’ mediated interactions between the ‘big
center’ and the population. On the one hand, the ‘big
center’ used them for its own purposes. On the other hand,
they defended their own members from the excessive
pressure of the ‘big center’ (Badie, 2000, pp. 54–55). To be
sure, the boundaries between the ‘big center’ and the
‘nested centers’ were blurred, moreover, ‘big centers’ did
not aspire to establish distinct boundaries even between
themselves (Giddens, 1984; Mann, 1986).
In this sense modern polities fundamentally differ from
the pre-modern ones. “Whereas in some societies, where
there is a major center there are also minor centers, the
existence of which diminishes the centrality of the major
center, in the societies of the type of which we wish to take
note at this point, there is a center which excludes all other
centers and seeks to preempt their functions. To put it
somewhat differently, the periphery of the type of society
under consideration is under more intense, more contin-
uous impingement from the center. The center dominates
and saturates the periphery – at least it aspires to do so and
to some extent it succeeds. The society becomes more
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action” (Shils, 1982, p. 60).
Consequently, the key process of political moderniza-
tion is that the single center eliminates all other centers
both institutionally and culturally (Eisenstadt & Schluchter,
1998). Institutionally, modern polities assume the building
of national state. Although, sometimes the term ‘state’ is
used for the designation of institutional organization of all
polities, it is not correct. Strictly speaking, the state is an
‘invention’ of modern polities, because only here, “A single
center of rule has established its exclusive entitlements to
control and employ the ultimate medium of political
activity – organized violence – over a deﬁnite territory. If
in the territory alternative seats of power can act with
impunity on the assumption that it cannot, then you no
longer have a state, but some other kind of polity” (Poggi,
2008, p. 87; see also Skinner, 1989). Culturally, the elimi-
nation of all other centers requires the emergence of new
political identity. Such an identity is not merely one more
identity, but a new type of identity. It covers all other group
identities, thereby eliminating their political signiﬁcance,
and originates a new type of political community. Because
it is a new type, we need a new concept, and, I suppose, the
usage of ‘nations’ just for the designation of modern
political communities seems to be absolutely reasonable.
What is precisely new in nations in terms of modern
political communities? First, nation is strongly connected
with the state as a special type of institutional system of
polity. The elimination of all other institutional centers and
the formation of the state as the only source of authority,
which has the sovereignty over deﬁnite territory, need
appropriate legitimacy. The members of modern polities
(citizens) must perceive themselves as a whole entity,
belonging to the state. It has to be noted that even if the
nation has not owned a state, as a rule, it aspires to ﬁnd the
state, and it is such an aspiration that transforms the
community of people into the nation. It means that nations
are genuinely political communities, while all other kinds
of communities (ethnical, tribal, religious, etc.) may or may
not have political signiﬁcance. Some of them could be
‘nested polities’ in pre-modern epoch, but all of them have
lost political signiﬁcance in modern polities. Third, the only
way to eliminate political signiﬁcance of all other commu-
nities is to develop the perception that all members of
a nation are equal in the face of the state, while all other
communities, identities, and hierarchies have become
unimportant in respect to the state. It is the idea of equality
that gives rise to the national identity. In contrast to pre-
modern polities, national identity presupposes that indi-
viduals belong topolitical community directly but not as the
members of particular groups. As Larry Siedentop notes,
“State sovereignty over individuals involved the emergence
of what can be called a primary role shared equally by all,
while other social roles – whether that of father, govern-
ment ofﬁcial or hairdresser – become secondary in relation
to that primary role” (Siedentop, 2001, p. 85).
It has to be emphasized that national identity, as well as
any other group identity is not a mere feeling of belonging
to the community. Conversely, the feeling of belonging
stems from deﬁnite interpretation of the world. “Identity
can be understood as an aspect of one’s cognitive map thatconcerns the conﬁguration and structure of one’s self in the
relation to the social world. The cognitive map is the image
of the social order held by a given social actor.” (Greenfeld
& Eastwood, 2007, p. 256; see also Brubaker & Cooper,
2000). That is why, as Michael Sandel remarks, “to say
that the members of a society are bound by a sense of
community is not simply to say that a great many of them
profess communitarian sentiments and pursue communi-
tarian aims, but rather that they conceive their identity .
as deﬁned to some extent by the community of which they
are part of. For them community describes not just what
they have as fellow citizens, but also what they are, not
a relationship they choose (as in a voluntary association)
but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute
but a constituent of their identity” (Sandel, 1982, p. 150).
A worldview that shapes a nation refers to nationalism.
Nationalism is deﬁned as the most fundamental image of
the social order inmodernity (Greenfeld&Eastwood, 2007);
the way of constructing collective identities in the circum-
stance of modern states (Calhoun,1997); theway ofmaking
sense of the modern world (Brubaker, 2009). It is also
possible to deﬁne nationalism in terms of ‘ideology’ or
‘culture’ if to understand them as webs of signiﬁcance
(Geertz, 1975). All these deﬁnitions are based on social
constructivist approach, which in opposition to essentialist
thinking, considers the world not as “objectively existing
reality”, but as that which people come to take into account,
attach importance to, describe, etc. In other words, for any
thing to bemeaningful, itmust be signiﬁed. In the process of
social interactions people develop common categorizations
(distinctions) that provide themwith a possibility to signify
certain aspects of things and not take into consideration of
other aspects (Berger & Luchmann, [1990] 1966). The
systems of categorization do not only classify the world but
also establish ground for the institutional system of polity
and legitimate political order (Verdery, 1996, p. 226).
Nationalist worldview entails very special and unusual for
the most of human history way of categorization. It “repre-
sents the human world as divided into concrete communi-
ties, coextensive with the mass of the population or the
‘people’ which are themselves imagined (in ideal form
anyway) as being fundamentally unstratiﬁed” (Greenfeld &
Eastwood, 2007, p. 258). It is not accidentally that Benedict
Anderson deﬁnes nations as ‘imagined communities’
(Anderson, 1991) although, strictly speaking, any commu-
nity is a result of ‘social imaginary’ (Taylor, 2004).
Finally, it has to be emphasized ‘a dynamic and proc-
essual understanding’ of nations (Brubaker, 2009). Any
communities of people, including nations, as well as any
identities and worldviews, including nationalisms, are not
ﬁxed or ‘completed’ things. Conversely, they are rather
‘processes’, they ‘exist’ so far as they are reproduced in
social practices. It refers to the concept of ‘nation-building’
that can be deﬁned as the process of constructing and
reproducing a national identity.
Nation-building is the aspiration to justify and explain
why the population of the state is a whole entity. It means
that nation-builders have to provide the people with
appropriate notions, reasonable categorizations, cognitive
schemes, narratives, myths, and so forth. That is why
nation-building is a predominantly discursive process.
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attention to discursive nature of nationalism, “Nationalism,
in this perspective, is a political utilization of the symbol of
nation through discourse and political activity, as well as
the sentiment that draws people into responding to this
symbol’s use” (Verdery, 1996, p. 226).
Nationalist discourse is certainly political activity, since
the process of nation-building is inseparable from the
process of modern state-building.2 In this sense, modern
statesmen are all nationalists now.3 Although the state
seems to be the most important nation-builder, not only
statesmen but also many other political actors participate
in the nationalists discourse and nation-building process.
They dispute with each other because they hold different
notions concerning their own nation, since very different
set of notions enables to construct national identity; and
peoples’ perception of themselves as the nation can be
explained and justiﬁed through different ways. Variety of
nationalisms requires discussing in more detail the ques-
tion of the types of nationalism.
2. Types of nationalism
The starting point for the typology of nationalism is
shaped by striking distinction between the earlier and the
subsequent nationalisms. Most scholars agree that initially
nationalism was strongly connected with democracy.
Indeed, despite of signiﬁcant differences between English,
French,Americanandothernationalisms, inall of thesecases
the idea of nationwas themost important building block for
democracy. It is possible to say that modern democratic idea
wasborn as a national idea (Greenfeld,1992). In otherwords,
early nations were assumed not merely as modern political
communities but as ‘peoples’ who were the only source of
power. Itwas not surprising that belonging to thenationwas
perceived as citizenship. As Bryan Turner notes, “Pre-
modern forms of citizenship were associated with the city,
not with the nation. modern citizenship is a political
product of major revolutions. These revolutions were
important because they destroyed the system of estates and
created both modern nationalism and citizenship” (Turner,
2006, p. 227). Democratic national citizenship entailed that
the members of the nation not only had equal rights and
responsibilities but also participated in democratic political
process (Kymlicka and Norman, 1995, p. 301).
Nevertheless, as the process of political modernization
and nation-state building spread over the world, initial
content of national idea has transformed to a great extent.2 As Pierre Bourdieu has convincingly argued, the struggle over
naming, counting, classifying, etc. is the core of political activity, since
they are these discursive practices that construct and transform political
stratiﬁcations and, ultimately, establish deﬁnite political order (Bourdieu,
1987).
3 Sometimes the term ‘nationalism’ is used for the designation of
disrespectful attitudes toward people of other ethnic groups in everyday
life but it is not always accurate. The feeling of hostility (ethnic, tribe, race
and so forth) can be called nationalism only if it is accompanied by
political aspiration. Such, the slogans like “Russia for Russians”, “Beat
Jews and rescue Russia” have obvious political connotation. However, not
all demonstrations of the feeling of ethnic hostility pertain to
nationalism.The key issue here is that in Modernity nations have
become ‘modular form’ of political communities
(Anderson,1991). In other words, political communities are
supposed to be the nations, since the world political order
is based on the system of sovereign states, which have yet
remained the typical and, actually, only possible form of
polity. Consequently, ‘new states’, the number of which has
increased enormously, especially after de-colonization of
the middle of the XX century, have to follow requests of
modern political order. They declare themselves as nation-
states but their foundations are certainly not the same as in
Western polities. As far back as the middle of the XX
century scholars concluded that in most of ‘new states’
nationalisms signiﬁcantly differed from Western model of
‘liberal, civic, and democratic’ nationalism. Hans Kohn has
expressed this in a famous dichotomy ‘civic versus ethnic
nationalisms’ (Kohn, 1944). Such distinction and also some
similar ones – ‘Western versus Eastern’, ‘political versus
cultural’ nationalisms – has been held by many researchers
(Calhoun, 2007). Some scholars distinguish ‘good’ (liberal,
democratic, peaceful) and ‘bad’ (xenophobic, particular-
istic, authoritarian) nationalisms (Kymlicka, 1999).
The ‘civic versus ethnic’ dichotomy has been enriched
by Liah Greenfeld in her comparative study of nationalisms.
She has revealed a strong difference between French and
Anglo-Saxon nationalisms, although they were closed to
civic type. It allowed her to introduce the second dimension
in the typology of nationalism that was the distinction
between individualistic and collective nationalisms. While
the ﬁrst considers the members of nation as free and equal
individuals, the second gives quite distinct interpretation of
a nation, notably, as a collective individual, endowed with
awill and interest of its own, which are independent of and
take priority over the wills and interests of individuals.
Greenfeld concludes that collective nationalism can be
either civic (France) or ethnic (Russia and Germany) but
individualistic (liberal) nationalism can correlate with only
civic type (Greenfeld, 1992).
Nonetheless, further ﬁndings have uncovered signiﬁ-
cant limitations of ‘civic versus ethnic’ dichotomy. Bernard
Yack argues that such contradiction is something like
delusion since one can reveal ethnic background in each
case of civic nationalisms. “The political identity of the
French, the Canadian, or the American is not based on a set
of rationally chosen political principles. No matter how
much residents of the United States might sympathize with
political principles favored by most French or Canadian
citizens, it would not occur to them to think of themselves
as French or Canadian. An attachment of certain political
principles maybe a necessary condition of loyalty to the
national community for many citizens of contemporary
democracies; they are very far from a sufﬁcient condition
for that loyalty” (Yack,1999, p. 106). Yack disagrees with the
possibility of purely rational civic nationalism and in this
sense he claims that any nationalism is based onmyths and
irrational sentiments. His view is conﬁrmed by some other
researchers. In particular, Samuel Huntington in his well-
known investigation of American political identity, which is
undoubtedly the most typical example of civic nationalism,
treats basic notions of American identity as ‘dogmas’, ‘civic
religion’, etc. Moreover, he convincingly demonstrates that
Table 1
Types of nationalism.
Model of interactions
among members
Model of national membership
Openness
(inclusiveness)
Closeness
(exclusiveness)
Universalism (hierarchical status
was to be achieved)
I II
Particularism (hierarchical status
was to be assigned at birth)
III IV
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– White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) have obviously ethnic
origin (Huntington, 2004).
In view of these arguments it seems to be reasonable to
transform ‘civic versus nation’ dichotomy. Also, I suppose,
transformed typology of nationalism should be based on
‘ways of national identity building’ rather than the content
of nationalists ideas as such. Firstly, since nationalism
always contains ethnic component, it would be more
fruitful to focus on the way of thinking about the national
membership. In this context Brubaker’s comparative study
of French and German nationhood is of signiﬁcant impor-
tance. Brubaker has highlighted that French and German
idioms of nationhood differ markedly, “If the French
understanding of nationhood has been state-centered and
assimilationist, the German understanding has been Volk-
centered and differentialist” (Brubaker, 1992, p. 1). This
distinction is particularly embodied and expressed in the
deﬁnition of citizenship – relatively open in France and
remarkably closed for non-German immigrants in
Germany. It does not mean that French nationhood
excludes ethnicity as such but French citizenship to a great
extent entails also assimilation in the ethnic sense. In
Germany, conversely, ethnic features control access to
national membership. Consequently, Brubaker’s criteria of
‘model of national membership’ (the degree of openness/
closeness or inclusiveness/exclusiveness) would be the ﬁrst
dimension of the transformed typology of nationalism.
Secondly, since nationalism is a worldview that is
assigned to legitimate modern political order, it has to be to
some extent civic. The perception of the social reality
through the prism of dividing the world into nations is the
speciﬁc categorization that allows making a distinction
between the people producing feeling of belonging to the
nation. Nevertheless, ‘civic component’ may also show
itself in what would be called as ‘civicism’ which is the
perception of all members of the nation as equal individ-
uals. It means that in public interactions citizens hold
universalistic patterns of behavior. Such universalism is
strongly opposed to particularism of pre-modern polities,
but pre-modern particularism may either withhold or
transform in the process of nation-building. If that is the
case, the nation is perceived by people as awhole entity but
the entity that is segmented into some groups which are
organized in a hierarchical order in respect of the nation.
While universalistic model of relations between citizens
assumes that hierarchical status was to be achieved, in
particularistic model status was to be assigned at birth.
Thus, the second dimension of the transformed typology of
nationalism – ‘model of interactions among members’
(universalism versus particularism) – would be whether
there is ‘civicism’ in nationalists image of the nation. To
some extent ‘civicism’ correlates to Greenfeld’s distinction
between individualistic and collective nationalisms but it is
not the same.
Consequently, I offer two dimensions (axes) for the
typology of nationalism. Overlapping, they give us four
types which are presented in Table 1.
In contrast to Greenfeld’s typology, transformed version
allows us to distinguish four but not three types of
nationalism. The ﬁrst and the forth types are fairly closed totraditional ‘civic versus ethnic’ dichotomy. The ﬁrst class of
nations is based on the worldview which allows them to
include individuals regardless of their race, ethnic, reli-
gious, and other qualities. Also, such worldview assigns
citizens to relate to each other equally regardless of their
group belonging. It means that political hierarchy is
presumably grounded on personal achievements. Anglo-
Saxon and French nationalisms can be referents of the type.
The forth class is based on quite opposite perception of the
world. A nation is constructed around speciﬁc group,
usually ethnic group; therefore, the access to the national
membership is fairly hard. The second and the third types
are something intermediate. Worldview of nations of the
second type demands from citizens interacting with each
other on universal patterns regardless of their group
belonging. Nevertheless, it is accompanied by fairly hard
requirements for the recognition of membership in the
nation. Contemporary Germany seems to pertain to the
type. Finally, the third class of nations, conversely, is based
on such understanding of nationhood which welcomes
admission of new members to the national membership
but the nation differentiated into some groups which are in
hierarchical order.
3. The image of Russian nation in the Kremlin
discource
Many sources are available for studying political
discourse in contemporary Russia. They range on the basis
of genre – speeches, writings, interviews, etc. It is also
possible to divide the sources into some categories
depending on their origin – authorship (the Presidents of
the Russian Federation, deputies of the State Duma,
Government ofﬁcials, Kremlin ofﬁcials or advisers, pro-
government media, etc). Maria Gavrilova analyzes discur-
sive articulations of such concepts as ‘narod’ (people),
‘vlast’ (power), and ‘Russia’ in inauguration speeches of the
Russian Presidents (4 speeches – 1991, 1996, 2000 and
2004) (Gavrilova, 2006). Ekaterina Levintova extends the
scope of sources to include awide range of texts (250 units)
which were produced by 26 most inﬂuential experts – so-
called ‘intellectual elite’ (of both pro-government and
opposition orientations) (Levintova, 2002).
The sampling of sources for this article is dictated by its
purpose. Inasmuch as the object of the analysis is ofﬁcial
(Kremlin) discourse, I use the ‘most ofﬁcial’ data – speeches
of the Presidents. At the same time, the inauguration
speeches seem to be insufﬁcient in respect to both quantity
(5 units) and quality (this kind of speeches are overly
ceremonial and triumphant). Therefore, I focus on the
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of the Russian Federation. Some speciﬁc features of these
texts make them appropriate for the paper’s goal. Firstly,
the practice of ofﬁcial addressing of the President to the
Federal Assembly goes back to 1994. Not one year was
missed. Hence, I have available 14 addresses including 6
authored by President Yeltsin, 7 authored by President
Putin, and 1 authored by President Medvedev. Secondly,
annual addresses are very ofﬁcial speeches. As well known,
documents like these are prepared over a long time by the
teams of the best Kremlin experts, speechwriters, and
advisers. They are subject to careful deliberations. Gener-
ally, they reﬂect ofﬁcial worldviews as much as possible.
Thus, I have analyzed what image of Russian nation is
produced by the Presidents in their addresses from the
standpoint of the typology of nationalism developed above.
Some results are presented below.3.1. Russianness
First and foremost, one speciﬁc feature of the term of
‘Russians’ in Russian language has to be taken into account.
There are two words which are translated in English as
‘Russians’. The ﬁrst is ‘rossiyane’. It is ‘rossiayne’ that is
associated with ‘Russian nation’ and nationalism. The
second – ‘russkie’ – has strongly ethnic connotation that is
similar to ‘ethnic German’, ‘ethnic Chinese’, etc. in respect
of the members of the Western nations who are descen-
dants from Germany, China, etc. respectively. Conse-
quently, what is the correlation between ‘rossiayne’ and
‘russkie’ in the Presidents’ speeches is of special impor-
tance. Some pieces of the Russian Presidents’ Addresses
that are more relevant in answering the question are
examined below.4
The ﬁrst remarkable topic is so-called ‘Russian-speaking
population’ in New Independent States – the former
Republics of the Soviet Union. It has been the issue of great
importance after the USSR’s collapse. Already the ﬁrst
Address delivered in 1994, President Yeltsin gave consid-
eration to the issue: “In all spheres of relations with the
countries of CIS and Baltic we should permanently focus on
the concerns of the Russians (‘rossiyane’) who come to be
abroad. Wherever they live, our compatriots have to feel
themselves enjoying full rights and equal rights”. In the
next Address (1995) he declared again: “We should pay
special attention to our citizens and compatriots living
abroad”. Almost the same idea is presented in the next
addresses (1997, 1998, 1999, 2001). The Presidents use the
term ‘compatriots’ (‘sootechestvenniki’) in respect to the
deﬁnite sort of people. Who are they? How do the Presi-
dents identify compatriots within the CIS and Baltics states
citizens?
In 2003, President Putin made an attempt to concep-
tualize the idea of ‘compatriots’ more precisely and
distinguished two categories of ‘compatriots’. The ﬁrst4 Hereinafter all quotations are from the ofﬁcial site of Russian
Presidents: http://president.kremlin.ru/eng/sdocs/speeches.shtml?
stype¼127286 (Annual Addresses of the Presidents to the Federal
Assembly of the Russian Federation. 1994–2008).group was the persons who have arrived in Russia from the
CIS countries, but had no Russian citizenship: “Currently,
over a million people who came to Russia after the collapse
of the Soviet Union and before the new law on citizenship
was passed have found themselves in an extremely difﬁcult
situation. These people who came to Russia have lived
and worked in this country, taken part in its political life,
and many of them have served in the Russian army. And
now they are persons without citizenship in their own
country”. The second group was those who were outside
Russia. Putin called for the softening of immigration policy
“particularly for residents of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States. For people who are close to us and with
whom we have a good understanding, and with whom we
share the same language. These are people of our common
Russian culture”. It is this phrase that provides the most
essential deﬁnition of a part of the CIS population as
‘Russians’: “close to us”, “good understanding”, “the same
language”, “common Russian culture”. In 2005, Putin
deﬁned as “compatriots” tens of millions people living
abroad: “Above all, we should acknowledge that the
collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical
disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became
a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and
compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory”.
At the same time, the analysis shows that the Russian
Presidents know the term ‘russkie’ in the sense of ‘ethnic
Russians’ but they use it in quite limited cases, speciﬁcally
when they speak about interethnic relations in some
regions (ﬁrst of all, in so-called ‘national republics’ such as
Tatarstan or Bashkortostan). Speaking ‘rossiyane’, the
Presidents never reduce this term to ‘ethnic russkie’. On the
contrary, they underscored the multiethnic sense of the
concept: “the foundation of sovereign authority in the
Russian Federation is its multinational people” (1995).
References to cultural commonalities run through all
Presidents’ addresses. In 1995, it was marked that ’“it is the
domestic culture that provides integrity of the nation,
develops and strengthens original spirituality and
humanism”. The same idea sounded in 1998 and 1999.
President Putin also more than once (2004, 2005) spoke
about common culture as one of the foundations of
“Russianness”.
Consequently, we are able to make a reasonable
conclusion that neither ethnicity nor citizenship, but
cultural commonality is assumed as the deﬁnition of
‘Russianness’ in the presidential speeches. Acquirement of
the Russian culture is opened for any personwho desires to
become a part of the Russian nation. Russian population
includes a lot of ethnic groups, and all of them are assumed
as ‘rossiyane’ provided that they share ‘Russian culture’.
It is worth to note that the deﬁnition of ‘Russianness’ in
the ofﬁcial discourse is corresponded to a great extent to
mass orientations and attitudes. Sociological surveys show
that ‘Russianness’ is perceived presumably in non-ethnic
deﬁnitions. Thus, in the middle of 1990s, respondents were
asked what features were obvious for ‘Russianness’. The
distribution of responses was as follows (in descending
order): ‘love of Russia’ – 87%; ‘love of Russian culture and
habits’ – 84%; ‘Russian language’ – 80%; ‘self-perception’ –
79%; ‘Russian citizenship’ – 56%; ‘signing as Russian in the
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and 24% (both parents); ‘Russian character’ – 50%;
‘orthodox faith’ – 43%; ‘Russian residents’ – 32%; ‘Russian
appearance’ – 22% (Klyamkin & Lapkin, 1995, p. 87). In the
2000s, the understanding of ‘Russianness’ has not changed.
Responding to the question who can be assumed as
Russian, 41% choose the answer ‘those who share Russian
culture’; 36% ‘those who love Russia’; 29% – ‘those who
perceive themselves as Russian’. At the same time only 26%
of the respondents considered ancestry (‘Russian parents’)
and 10% – citizenship – as the main feature (Tikhonova,
2007, p. 172).
3.2. Russian culture: language and values
Treatment of the national culture as the foundation of
‘Russianness’ is not an extraordinary phenomenon. Strictly
speaking, any nationalism is nothing more than a common
worldview that is the set of cultural senses. The matter is
what senses are understood as Russian culture. Giving the
deﬁnition of Russian culture, the Presidents pay great
attention to the Russian language, but they prefer to
designate it as ‘common language’, ‘one language’ (2003),
avoiding the word ‘Russian’. Consequently, Russian
language is of great importance not as such but as amean of
acquirement of the Russian culture and has rather inclusive
than exclusive effect.
The Addresses contain some references to special values
and features that are inherent to the Russians. The Presi-
dents repeatedly made statements about the presence of
shared values. In three addresses (1996, 2003, 2008) they
attempted to uncover the ‘Russian values’ in more detail.
President Yeltsin put the question directly: “I see the future
Russia as the country inwhich citizens, irrespective of their
political opinions, are integrated by adherence to funda-
mental ideals and values. What are they? How do I
understand them?” The answer was: democratic state-
hood, civic consciousness, and patriotism. It is remarkable
that Yeltsin cited Russian statesman of the beginning of XX
century Petr Stolypin: “Actual liberty is a sum of civic
freedom and the feeling of statehood and patriotism”. In
2003, Putin highlighted key points differently. He speciﬁed
as the main value not “democratic statehood” but “main-
taining the state spread over vast territory”: “It is my
conviction that without consolidation at the least around
basic national values and objectives, we will not be able to
withstand these threats. I would like to recall that
throughout our history Russia and its people have accom-
plished and continue to accomplish a truly historical feat,
a great work performed in the name of our country’s
integrity and in the name of bringing it peace and a stable
life. Maintaining a state spread over such a vast territory
and preserving a unique community of peoples while
keeping up a strong presence on the international stage is
not just an immense labour, it is also a task that has cost our
people untold victims and sacriﬁce. Such has been Russia’s
historic fate over these thousand and more years. Such has
been the way Russia has continuously emerged as a strong
nation. It is our duty never to forget this, and we should
remember it now, too, as we examine the threats we face
today and the main challenges to which we must rise”.The theme of national values was actually the focus of
the ﬁrst Address of President Medvedev. He placed the
topic in the starting part of his speech: “Now I would like to
speak about our values. They are well known. There is
justice, which we understand as political equality, honest
courts and responsible leaders. Justice is embodied in
practice as social guarantees and the ﬁght against poverty
and corruption, the efforts to give each individual a decent
place in our society and give the Russian nation as a whole
a worthy place in the system of international relations.
There is freedom – personal, individual freedom. It means
economic freedom, freedom of speech and religion,
freedom to choose one’s place of residence and one’s job.
And there is general national freedom, the independence
and freedom of the Russian state. There is the welfare and
dignity of human life. There is interethnic peace and the
unity of diverse cultures. There is protection for small
peoples, and the recognition of South Ossetia’s and
Abkhazia’s independence is an example of this protection.
There are family traditions, love and faithfulness, care for
the young and for the old. There is patriotism, along with
themost sober and critical look at our country’s history and
our far from ideal present, belief in Russia that shines
through no matter what the circumstances, deep-rooted
love for our native land and our great culture. These are our
values, the foundations of our society and our moral
beacons. To put things more simply, it is these self-evident
things that we all understand that are what make us
a single people, what make us Russia. These are the things
that we will never give up no matter what the circum-
stances. Our values form our vision of the future. We aspire
to a fair society of free people. We know that Russia will be
a prosperous and democratic country. It will be a strong
country that offers its people a comfortable life. It will be
the best country in the world for the most talented,
demanding, independent and critically-inclined citizens”.
It is not hard to note that the rhetoric of Medvedev has
changed in comparison with Putin. Medvedev refers to
freedom, democracy, responsible leaders, etc; and in this
sense he is somewhere between Yeltsin and Putin. In
general, one can ﬁnd some disagreements in presidential
addresses in understanding what Russian values are but
beyond the differences all Russian Presidents strongly focus
on such values as statehood and patriotism.
In regard to the value of statehood, one can discover that
the key deﬁnitions of Russian statehood in the presidential
addresses are connected with rather ‘external’ than
‘internal’ features. First of all, in all addresses such deﬁni-
tion of Russia as ‘great’ is emphasized. It has both geopo-
litical (territory, size, resources) and international
connotations. The second deﬁnition is ‘strong’ Russia. It is
remarkable that while the attribute ‘great’ is used by Yeltsin
and Putin equally, the deﬁnition ‘strong’ has received
development only since 2000. Putin used it in every
address, 5 times in 2000, 9 times in 2003. “If Russia remains
weak, we really will have to make the former choice. And it
will be the choice of aweak state. It will be the choice of the
weak. The only real choice for Russia is the choice of
a strong country. A country that is strong and conﬁdent of
itself” (2000). “Now we must take the next step and focus
all our decisions and all our action on ensuring that in a not
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among the ranks of the truly strong, economically
advanced and inﬂuential nations. And all our decisions, all
our actions – to subordinate to that already in the fore-
seeable future Russia has strongly taken a place among
really strong, economically advanced and inﬂuential states
of the world. Our entire historical experience shows that
a country like Russia can live and develop within its
existing borders only if it is a strong nation. All of the
periods during which Russia has been weakened, whether
politically or economically, have always and inexorably
brought to the fore the threat of the country’s collapse”
(2003).
It is not hard to notice that the deﬁnitions of ‘great’ and
‘strong’ are similar expressions but place different
emphases. Whereas ‘great Russia’ means, more likely,
potential capabilities of the country, ‘strong Russia’
expresses rather the realization of this potential. ‘Strong’ in
Putin’s addresses appears in different contexts such as in
references to armed forces development, economic growth,
etc. However the most obvious connotation of ‘strong’ is
related to international relations. ‘Strong Russia’ is assumed
as an independent and powerful actor: “Ours is a free
nation. And our place in the modern world, I wish to
particularly emphasize this, will only depend on how
strong and successful we are.”
3.3. Russian idea
In order to better understand why the value of state-
hood in the sense of ‘great’ and ‘strong’ Russia is so
important we have to place it in a broader context that
refers the vision of Russia’s place in the world history. As it
is well known, for a long time the thesis of ‘Russian way’
(‘Russian idea’) remains to be one of the key points in the
Russian political discourse. The idea is fairly vague but,
generally, it emphasizes uniqueness of the Russian civili-
zation and its cultural originality. Russians are viewed as
the people of great historical mission, as those who
inherited special ‘spirituality’ (‘duchovnost’). It has to be
noted that ‘spirituality’ is not assumed as any natural
(primordial) feature of ‘ethnic Russians’. Conversely, those
who acquire ‘spirituality’ are included in ‘Russians’ as the
nation.
Russian ‘uniqueness’ has already occurred in early
presidential addresses. In 1996, President Yeltsin empha-
sized: “We are frequently frightened by the loss of the
Russian originality. I am conﬁdent, it will not take place.
Russia is the whole world which originality was kept
during all Russian history”. At the same time the President
pointed out that the Russian speciﬁcity is accompanied by
openness and receptivity. By and large, the Presidents have
kept the similar approach during the entire period. On the
one hand, almost in all addresses Russia is deﬁned as “open
for international integration”, “willing to participate in the
building of ‘the Big Europe’”, etc. On the other hand,
‘uniqueness’, ‘originality’, ‘own way’, etc. are always
emphasized. Already in 1999 Yeltsin declared: “For these
years we have understood that a universal way of social
development does not exist. But it would be the deepest
mistake to assume Russian own way as self-isolation. Theonly means to realize our huge potential is the recognition
of both the originality of Russia and its involvement in the
global world”.
Putin’s and Medvedev’s position on this point has not
essentially differed from Yeltsin’s, but the stress on
‘uniqueness’ has been stronger. The most noteworthy is the
2005 address where Putin developed the concept of
‘sovereign democracy’. “Russia is a country that has chosen
democracy through the will of its own people. It chose this
road of its own accord and it will decide itself how best to
ensure that the principles of freedom and democracy are
realized here, taking into account our historic, geopolitical
and other particularities and respecting all fundamental
democratic norms. As a sovereign nation, Russia can and
will decide for itself the timeframe and conditions for its
progress along this road.”
Almost all researchers share the opinion that idea of
‘Russian special way’ has deep roots in mass consciousness.
Nevertheless, usually they point to the same vagueness of
this idea in people’s minds as in the ofﬁcial discourse. On
the basis of his own study Boris Dubin concludes that the
function of the idea is not to give any deﬁnitions of
‘Russianness’, but rather to ﬁx Russian ‘exclusiveness’, ‘non-
belonging to the world’. Dubin points out that “the West in
Russianmind is the indication to the ‘signiﬁcant Other’. The
West is actually the synonym of the border of self-identi-
ﬁcation. It is the border that is, paradoxically, drawn
outside. TheWest, but not Russia is the sensed point. Russia
as the concept can be derived only from the West. It is the
“secondary phenomenon” which is perceived just through
“non-belonging” to the West” (Dubin, 2000, p. 31). In line
with this ﬁnding Lev Gudkov developed the concept of
“negative identity”. He argues that “community is consti-
tuted by a reference to the negative factor – alien or
hostile – that becomes the necessary prerequisite for group
solidarity. The members of the community are perceived
themselves as such only in the framework of this opposi-
tion to the Other” (Gudkov, 2000, p. 37).
Furthermore, ‘Russian idea’ includes the feeling of
accountability for the humankind, especially for small
nations which need help and support. The thesis about
‘special historical mission’, which was quite typical in the
Soviet period, can be revealed in the presidential addresses.
In 2005, President Putin mentioned that “Russia should
continue its civilizing mission on the Eurasian continent.
This mission consists in ensuring that democratic values,
combined with national interests, enrich and strengthen
our historic community”. Medvedev in 2008 also pointed
out special mission of Russia. In his interpretation one of
the values of special importance is the “protection for small
peoples”, and he cited the cases of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia as examples of successful accomplishment of this
mission.
In the context of ‘Russian idea’ the value of statehood
takes on special signiﬁcance. Statehood matters not so
much in itself but as the means of the achievement of
Russian destination. ‘Russian state’ is surely neither
‘Western state’ (the institution of civic cooperation) nor
‘ethnic state’ (the institution of ethnic exclusion) but
necessary institution for the movement toward ‘Russian
way’. At the same time, ‘great and strong Russia’ is one of
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other nations recognize the special signiﬁcance of Russia.
3.4. Russian ‘sobornost’ and patriotism
In spite of the great attention given to “internal” char-
acteristics of Russian state in the Presidents’ addresses,
many of deﬁnitions such as ‘democratic’, ‘stability’, etc.
were not articulated an intelligible image but the other
group – ‘unity’, ‘accordance’, ‘consolidation’ – is muchmore
understandable. All presidential addresses are saturated by
them. Russian nation is certainly perceived by the Kremlin
as an entity consolidated around the state. But it is only at
the ﬁrst glance like a Greenfeld’s ‘collective nationalism’
which claims a priority of collective (national) interests
over individual ones (Greenfeld, 1992). Russian national
‘unity’ would be much more strictly designated by the
concept of ‘sobornost.’ Comprehensive analysis of the
concept, which derives from sacral (orthodox) discourse,
was undertaken by Nikolay Biryukov and Viktor Sergeev.
They distinguish the main features of this phenomenon: “If
the people are assumed as something like the whole
totality, there is no need to seek any mutually coordinated
decision. The decision is conceived as evident and forcible
obligatoriness in relation to all the members of community,
including the decision-makers. The only procedure that
would be needed is securing of totality of the people as
such. It causes to the idea of “sobornost” that is the central
idea of such type of worldview” (Biryukov & Sergeev, 1992,
p. 29).
While in ‘collective nationalism’, as in France, national
interests are usually the subject of discussion; and they are
deﬁned through political process, ‘sobornost’ presupposes
that national interests have been already known, self-
evident, and unquestionable; and it is the destination of
Russia (‘Russian way’) that is the key undisputed issue.
Consequently, meaningful of ‘unity’ does not concern
governmental policies, since in the face of ‘Russian desti-
nation’ policy issues are all questions of secondary impor-
tance. Russians can be dissatisﬁed with policy-making but
they are inclined to ‘forgive’ the ruling elite provided that
the state is in keeping of Russian idea.5
The idea of ‘sobornost’ is closely related to the value of
patriotism. In regard to ‘patriotism’, in 1996 Yeltsin devel-
oped a fairly comprehensive deﬁnition: “For me patriotism
is a special state of mind, when the person is living by
a pain of Fatherland, feeling of afﬁliation to its triumphs
and defeats, feeling a pride in the national traditions, of
a belonging to the great country”. Putin supported the same
view of patriotism: “a feeling of a pride in the country” and
”a love of the native land”. Both Presidents used the
metaphor of ‘home’: “We have to support and strengthen
the feeling of the common home” (1998); “Russia is above
all the people who consider this country to be their home”5 It is quite remarkable that talking about performance of everyday
policies respondents evaluated President Putin not very high. For
example, in 2006 only 31% supposed that Putin was successful in
economic policy, 37% – in Chechen conﬂict resolution while the general
trust in Putin was on incredibly high level (more than 70%)
(Obschestvennoe Mnenie–2006, 2007, Table 7.2.11).(2000). President Medvedev also focused on emotional
feelings. He understood patriotism as “belief in Russia that
shines through no matter what the circumstances, deep-
rooted love for our native land and our great culture”.
Consequently, patriotism, from the Russian presidents’
point of view, is not simply the feeling of afﬁliation to the
motherland. It has much more strong sense and includes
the idea of self-sacriﬁcingness in the name of Russian idea.
Such a connotation is possible only in the framework of
‘sobornost’.
The stress on patriotism, obviously, is accompanied by
references to Russian history. There are repeatedly refer-
ences to the historical commonality (1999, 2003, 2005).
Since patriotism is determined as a ‘pride in the country’,
the Presidents refer to those events and ﬁgures of the past
which have symbolic and unifying meaning. So, Putin
spoke about the heroic feats, which weremade in the name
of Russia, and repeatedly mentioned the Great Patriotic
war. As a whole, it is possible to say, that since 2000 the
historical component has been ampliﬁed. In particular,
‘rehabilitation’ of the Soviet period has taken place. In 1996
the Soviet system was presumably viewed negatively: “the
Communist project has not stood the test for the big
historical distance.. The Soviet Union has failed under the
weight of universal crisis due to economic, political and
social contradictions”. In 2005, therewas quite the opposite
evaluation: “we should acknowledge that the collapse of
the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the
century”.
4. Conclusion
The analysis of Annual Addresses of the Russian Presi-
dents to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation
allows making the conclusion that the Kremlin perceives
Russians as a nation in neither narrow ‘ethnic’ nor pure
‘civic’ senses. The Presidents strongly focus on multiethnic
meaning of Russians, which is apparently emphasized
through the special concept of ‘rossiyane’. Nevertheless, it
does not mean that ‘rossiyane’ embrace and are restricted
to the citizens of Russia. The key feature of ‘Russianness’ in
the Kremlin discourse is the commitment to the Russian
culture: language, history, values of statehood and patri-
otism, the idea of the strong and great Russia, uniqueness of
the Russian civilization. Anyone can be recognized as
‘Russian’ as long as he/she shares these values. Judging by
the presidential addresses, the Kremlin recognizes as
‘Russian’ even those who are not Russian citizens but
committed to the Russian culture. Consequently, from the
point of the ﬁrst dimension of nationalism (model of
national membership), Russian nationalism (at least in
ofﬁcial version) certainly demonstrates openness (inclu-
siveness), maybe even over-openness.
At the same time, such over-openness is possible only if
nationalist worldview neglects citizenship. Indeed, if
a cultural commonality is a necessary condition for the
national membership, while a citizenship is not a sufﬁcient
condition, we have a nation with very weak component of
‘civicism’. Next, in contrast to ‘civicism’, which is based on
rather rational notions of equal rights and responsibilities
and universalistic patterns of behavior, the Kremlin image
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way’, great historical mission as the destination of Russia.
The notion of ‘sobornost’ dismisses Russians from active
and conscious participation in political process. Finally,
openness of nationalism entails (at least, potentially)
permanent expansion of the nation ‘outside itself’ in order
to ‘absorb’ those groups who are able to accept the Russian
culture. Such acceptance requires deﬁnite period of time. It
means that in any moment Russian nation includes both
‘core of the nation’ and ‘aspirants’ whish are in hierarchical
order. Consequently, from the point of the second dimen-
sion of nationalism (model of interaction amongmembers),
Russian nationalism falls into the category of particularism.
Hierarchical status here is rather ‘to be assigned’ than ‘to be
achieved’.
One can suggest that speciﬁcity of Russian ofﬁcial
nationalism is explained by historical reasons, ﬁrst of all,
imperial legacies. Indeed, Russian nationalism in some
aspects resembles imperial worldview, although, it is
certainly the special sort of nationalism. However, this issue
isnot the focusof thearticle andrequiresadditional research.
Acknowledgment
I would like to thanks Dr. Tsuneo Akaha, Professor at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies, for his helpful
comments and suggestions on the initial version of the
article. I am especially thankful to Tammy Gasan-Dzhala-
lova, postgraduate student of London School of Economics
and Political Science, for her great assistance in the prep-
aration of the article.
References
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined communities: Reﬂection on the origin and
spread of nationalism. London: Verso.
Annual addresses of the Presidents to the Federal Assembly of the
Russian Federation. 1994–2008. http://president.kremlin.ru/eng/sdocs/
speeches.shtml?stype¼127286.
Badie, B. (2000). The imported state: The westernization of the political
order. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Berger, P., & Luchmann, T. (1990/1966). The social construction of reality: A
treatise in the sociology of knowledge. New York: Anchor Books.
Bourdieu, P. (1987). Distinction: A social critique of the judgment of taste.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Brubaker, R., & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond “identity”. Theory and Society, 29,
1–47.
Brubaker, R. (1992). Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Brubaker, R. (2009). Ethnicity, race, and nationalism. Annual Review of
Sociology, 35, 21–42.
Calhoun, C. (1997). Nationalism. Milton Keynes/Minneapolis: Open
University Press/University of Minnesota Press.
Calhoun, C. (2007). Nations matter: Citizenship, solidarity, and the cosmo-
politan dream. New York: Rutledge.
Eisenstadt, S., & Schluchter, W. (1998). Introduction: paths to early
modernities – a comparative view. Daedalus, 127, 1–18.
Ferguson, Y., & Mansbach, R. (1996). Polities. Authority, identity, and
change. Columbia: University of South California Press.
Geertz, C. (1975). The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays. London:
Hutchinson.
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: The outline of the theory of
structuration. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gorski, P. (2006). Pre-modern nationalism. In G. Delanty, & K. Kumar (Eds.
), The SAGE handbook of nations and nationalism (pp. 143–156). Lon-
don/Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.Greenfeld, L. (1992). Nationalism: Five roads to modernity. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Greenfeld, L., & Eastwood, J. (2007). National identity. In C. Boix, & S.
Stokes (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative politics (pp. 256–
273). Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Huntington, S. (2004). Who are we? The challenges to America’s national
identity. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Kymlicka, W., & Norman, W. (1995). Return of the citizen: a survey of the
recent work on citizenship theory. In R. Beiner (Ed.), Theorizing citi-
zenship (pp. 283–322). Albany: State University of New York Press.
Kymlicka, W. (1999). Misunderstanding nationalism. In R. Beiner (Ed.),
Theorizing nationalism (pp. 131–140). Albany: State University of New
York Press.
Kohn, H. (1944). The idea of nationalism: A study in its origins and back-
ground. New York: Macmillan Company.
Mann, M. (1986)The sources of social power: A history of power from the
beginning to A.D. 1760, Vol. 1. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Poggi, G. (2008). The nation-state. In D. Caramani (Ed.), Comparative
politics (pp. 85–107). Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Sandel, M. (1982). Liberalism and the limits of justice. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Shils, E. (1982). The constitution of society. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Siedentop, L. (2001). Democracy in Europe. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Skinner, Q. (1989). The state. In T. T. Ball, J. Farr, & R. Hanson (Eds.),
Political innovation and conceptual change (pp. 90–131). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, C. (2004). Modern social imaginaries. Durham: Duke University
Press.
Turner, B. (2006). Citizenship, nationalism and nation-building. In G.
Delanty, & K. Kumar (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of nations and
nationalism (pp. 225–248). London/Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Verdery, K. (1996). Whither ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’? In G. Balakrishnan
(Ed.), Mapping the nation (pp. 226–234) London: Verso.
Yack, B. (1999). The myth of the civic nation. In Beiner., & Ronald. (Eds.),
Theorizing nationalism (pp. 103–118). Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press.In Russian language
Biryukov, N., & Sergeev, V. (1992). Demokratiya i sobornost: Stanovlenie
institutov predstavitel’noi vlasti v SSSR. [Democracy and sobornost: The
foundation of representative institutions in the USSA]. Moscow.
Dubin, B. (2000). Zapad, granitza, osobiy put’: simvolika grugogo v
politicheskoy mifologii sovremennoy Rossii. [The west, the boundary,
the special way: Symbols of the “other” in political mythology of
modern Russia]. Monitiring obshestvennogo mneniya. [Public Opinion
Monitoring], 6, 25–34.
Gavrilova, M. (2006). Klyucheviye kontzeptiy russkogo politicheskogo
diskursa “narod”, “vlast’”, “Rossia” v inauguratziyonniych vuystuple-
niyach rossiyskich prezidentov. [The key concepts of the Russian
political discourse “people”, “power”, “Russia” in the Presidents’
inauguration speeches]. Politex, 1.
Gudkov, L. (2000). Problemiy negativnoiy identiﬁcatzii. [The problem of
the negative identiﬁcation]. Monitiring obshestvennogo mneniya.
[Public Opinion Monitoring], 5, 35–44.
Klyamkin, I., & Lapkin, V. (1995). Russkiy vopros v Rossii. [Russian issue in
Russia]. POLIS, 5, 78–96.
Levintova, E. (2002). Politicheskiy diskurs v postsovetskoy Rossii. [Polit-
ical discourse in post-Soviet Russia]. Monitiring obshestvennogo
mneniya. [Public Opinion Monitoring], 2.
Obschestvennoe Mnenie–2006. (2007). [Public Opinion–2006. (2007)].
Moscow: Levada-Cente.
Tikhonova, N. (2007). Postimperscjiy sindrom ili poisk natsional’noy iden-
tichnisti. [Post-Empire syndrome and the searching for national identity].
In Posle imperii. Moscow: Liberal Mission. After Empirepp. 156–177.
Petr Panov is an Associate Professor of Political Science Department at the
Perm University, Russia. His research interests are in the processes of
institutionalization and legitimating of political order and comparative
study of political institutions. Address: 15 Bukireva, 614990, Perm, Russia.
E-mail: petrpanov@yandex.ru
